Volume 16

Issue 6

Article 2

1971

The Courts' Responsibility for Prison Reform
Edmund B. Spaeth Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Criminal Law
Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, First Amendment Commons, and the Law Enforcement and
Corrections Commons

Recommended Citation
Edmund B. Spaeth Jr., The Courts' Responsibility for Prison Reform, 16 Vill. L. Rev. 1031 (1971).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol16/iss6/2

This Symposia is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Villanova Law Review by an authorized editor of Villanova
University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository.

Spaeth: The Courts' Responsibility for Prison Reform

AUGUST

1971]

1031

PRISONERS' RIGHTS

THE COURTS' RESPONSIBILITY FOR PRISON REFORM
EDMUND
I.

B.

SPAETH, JR.t

INTRODUCTION

COURTS,

AS A RULE, are like Victorian children: they speak
only when spoken to. Thus, it may be said that their responsibility for prison reform is limited to the adjudication of such cases
as prisoners, or perhaps wardens, may present. After examining,
and participating in, such adjudications, however, I have concluded
that the courts' responsibility for prison reform may not be discharged
within the usual confines of a "case" or "controversy,"' and that if
the courts are to serve with honor, they must say what they expect
the prisons to do, and try to make them do it.
II.

THE LIMITATIONS OF PRISONERS'

SUITS

The courts' responses to prisoners' suits have proceeded from indifference to confusion, or, at least, uncertainty.
Over and over again it has been held either that the court has
no jurisdiction to hear the suit,8 or that the complaint fails to state
a cause of action because it concerns a matter within the prison
administrator's discretion, which the court will not review.' It seems
not to have mattered, or at any rate, not to have mattered enough,
that the consequence of such abstention was that no examination was
t Judge, Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia; Chairman, Pennsylvania Bar
Association Committee on Recodification of the Criminal Code. A.B., Harvard Uni-

versity, 1942; LL.B., Harvard University, 1948. Judge Spaeth has been much assisted
both in research and in the development of his argument, by his Clerk, Mr. Gerald
F. Tietz, Esquire.
1. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
2. See generally Jacob & Sharma, Justice After Trial: Prisoners'Need for Legal
Services in the Criminal-Correctional Process, 18 U. KAN. L. REV. 493 (1970);
Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 397
(1965) ; Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA.
L. REV. 985 (1962) ; Note, Judicial Intervention in Prison Administration, 9 Wm. &
MARY L. REV. 178 (1967) ; Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of
Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963)
Note, 84 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1970).
3. Oregon ex rel. Sherwood v. Gladden, 240 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Banning
v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (1954) ; Williams v.
Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 822 (1952) ; Siegel v. Ragen,
180 F.2d 785 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (1950) ; Powell v. Hunter, 172
F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1949) ; Curtis v. Jacques, 130 F. Supp. 920 (W.D. Mich. 1954);
People v. Collins, 200 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1960).
4. Kostal v. Tinsley, 337 F.2d 845 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 985
(1965); Harris v. Settle, 322 F.2d 908 (8th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 910
(1964); Childs v. Pegelow, 321 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 932
(1964); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862
(1961); Tabor v. Hardwick, 224 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 971
(1955); Ortega v. Ragen, 216 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 940
(1955); State ex rel. Renner v. Wright, 188 Md. 189, 51 A.2d 668 (1947) ; Commonwealth ex re. Smith v. Banmiller, 194 Pa. Super. 566, 168 A.2d 793 (1962).
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made of a claim, for example, that a prisoner had been beaten to
death, 5 or that he had been kept in an isolation cell for a year and
a half without proper medical treatment,6 or that he had been kept
in an isolation cell for two months without any clothes or blankets.7
I do not mean to oversimplify. There is something to be said
for abstention; judges have neither the time nor resources to manage
the prisons.' Nevertheless, one comes from the cases at least with
no pride, and sometimes in shame.
When reviewing Sidney and Beatrice Webbs' book on English
prisons, Bernard Shaw said:
Judges spend their lives in consigning their fellow creatures to
prison; and when some whisper reaches them that prisons are
horribly cruel and destructive places, and that no creature fit
to live should be sent there, they only remark calmly that prisons
are not meant to be comfortable; which is no doubt the consideration that reconciled Pontius Pilate to the practice of crucifixition.'
This is very painful, and I suspect that it was more remorse than
precedent that inspired the now famous statement by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, per curiam, that:
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except
those expressly, or by necessary implication, taken from him
by law. While the law does take his liberty and imposes a duty
of servitude and observance of discipline for his regulation and
5. Clark v. Ferling, 220 Md. 109, 151 A.2d 137 (1959).
6. Snow v. Gladden, 338 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1964).
7. United States ex rel. Atterbury v. Ragen, 237 F.2d 953 (7th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 353 U.S. 964 (1957).
8. In this respect, it is interesting to note the following observations taken from
an address by The Honorable Wade H. McCree, Jr., Judge, United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, during the proceedings of the Fifth Judicial Institute,
sponsored by the Crime Commission of Philadelphia, November 21-22, 1969, reported
in THE PRISON JOURNAL, at 30-31 (Autumn-Winter, 1969):
Last summer, I was a member at the law faculty of the Salzburg Seminar in
Austria and I took a busman's holiday and audited a criminal trial in which a
Yugoslav migrant worker was tried and convicted of altering his entry permit.
The judge and I discussed the trial when it was concluded, and he invited me to
visit the jail which was in a connecting building. I accepted, and was agreeably
surprised by its high level of sanitation and by the facilities for work and education even though it was for short term convicts and for persons detained awaiting
trial. However, the most interesting discovery was to learn that the judge had
general superintendence over the management of the jail and that the warden,
who was responsible for its actual operation, was required to answer to the judge
for any shortcomings in the treatment of inmates. Of course, Austria doesn't have
our separation of powers and both the warden and the judge were employees of
the Ministry of Justice.
Nevertheless, he exercised his concern and the inmates knew of it and looked
to him as a kind of Ombudsman for their problems.
We judges can't and shouldn't do that, but we should stimulate the public
to manifest a greater concern about what happens to the sentenced convict.
9. G.B. Shaw, THE CRIME OF IMPRISONMENT 14 (1946), published as a preface
to S. & B. Webb, ENGLISH PRISONS UNDER LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1922), quoted in
Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506, 558 (1963).
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that of other prisoners, it does not deny his right to personal
security against unlawful invasion.'0
No doubt the reference in this passage to "a duty of servitude"
was an oblique repudiation of the observation by the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals in 1871 that the prisoner is "the slave of the state.""
But if the prisoner is not a slave, neither is he a free man, and it
remains for the courts to define what they mean by the prisoner's
"right to personal security against unlawful invasion."
Generally, definition has been attempted in constitutional terms.
Perhaps most notable has been the decision of the Federal District
Court for the District of Arkansas declaring that confinement in the
state prison system constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the eighth amendment.' 2 Other amendments have also
served as the basis for granting relief,' 3 and, in addition, relief has
been granted on other grounds as well. For example, it has been held
that a complaint charging negligence for failure to maintain proper
guards, with the result that plaintiff was beaten in the prison yard,
states a cause of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act.' 4 Furthermore, a writ of mandamus has been issued upon a showing that the
prison administration discriminated against the petitioner in a manner
contrary to the prison regulations.'5
10. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 225 U.S.
887 (1945).
11. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871).
12. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). See Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, No. 1567,
(April Sessions, 1970), Nos. 353, 354, (May Sessions, 1970), Court of Common Pleas,
Philadelphia County (cases not reported). See also Ralph v. Warden, 438 F.2d 786
(4th Cir. 1970).
13. First amendment right to free speech: Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp.
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) ; cf. Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711 (D.C. Cir. 1953);
Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. App. 2d 8, 345 P.2d 513 (Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
First amendment right to freedom of religion: Howard v. Smyth, 365 F.2d 428 (4th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 988 (1967) ; Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474
(9th Cir. 1965) ; Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961) ; United States
ex rel. Oakes v. Taylor, 269 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1967) ; Fulwood v. Clemmer,
206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); Brown v. McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 180 N.E.2d 791,
225 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1962). Sixth amendment right to counsel: Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483 (1969) (upheld right to access to "jailhouse lawyers") ; Bailleaux v. Holmes,
177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), reversed sub nora. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d
632 (9th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961) (in dictum, however, recognized
reasonable access to the courts under fourteenth amendment due process) ; Brabson v.
Wilkins, 45 Misc. 2d 286, 256 N.Y.S.2d 693 (Sup. Ct. 1965), modified (but right to
access to counsel affirmed), 267 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 1966). Due process access
to courts: see Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139 (1964) ; cf. Hatfield v. Bailleaux,
290 F.2d 632 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (1961); United States ex rel.
Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
14. Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd, 374 U.S. 150
(1963).
15. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962). Federal civil rights
legislation has also served as a basis for relief: Sostre v. McGinnis, 334 F.2d 906
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964) ; Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d
Cir. 1961) ; and due process has served as a basis for granting habeas corpus relief:
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It might be supposed that such varied and resourceful litigation
ensures prison reform. I suggest, however, that it does not. My
apprehension may be explained by an examination of three opinions.
In McBride v. McCorkle,'6 the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey had before it a petition for an order to show
cause directing the principal keeper of the state prison to explain why
he was subjecting petitioner to cruel and unusual punishment through
prolonged solitary confinement, and why he was denying petitioner
the free exercise of his religion to attend Mass. The court treated
the prison system as a state administrative agency. Finding a final
decision by the agency, the court proceeded to review the petition
according to the following test:
There must be a rule of reason in all prison discipline. Conduct leading to open rebellion or insolence on the part of prisoners
cannot be permitted. A prisoner forfeits his free choice of conduct
at the moment of his commitment, especially where such conduct is
calculated to destroy the order and effectiveness of the institution. 7
The court found that the petitioner had neither been subjected to
cruel and unusual punishment nor denied the free exercise of his religion. The difficulty, however, is that these conclusions were reached
with no definition of what was the purpose of the prison. Thus, one
is left to wonder how the court satisfied itself that the discipline imposed on the petitioner was necessary to the "effectiveness of the institution," absent a definition of what the institution was supposed to do.
In In re Ferguson,8 ten inmates of a state prison filed a petition
in propria persona with the Supreme Court of California for a writ
of habeas corpus seeking, inter alia, the removal of restrictions imposed on their claimed religious activities as Black Muslims. The
court appointed counsel and issued an order to the Director of Corrections to show cause. In response, the Director admitted that he
had determined that the Muslims should not be classified as a religious group, and said that because the petitioners believed in the
supremacy of "the dark-skinned races," and would "kneel to no one"
who did not believe in their God, they "present[ed] a problem in
prison discipline and management."' 9 The court discharged the order
to show cause and denied the petition for a writ. Granting that freeUnited States ex rel. Noa v.Fay, 300 F.2d 345 (2d Cir. 1962), aff'd on other grounds,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; United States ex rel. Marcial v. Fay, 247 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.
1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 915 (1958).
16. 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A2d 881 (1957).
17. Id.at 478, 130 A.2d at 886.
18. 55 Cal. 2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 864 (1961).
19. Id.at 667, 670, 361 P.2d at 418, 420.
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dom of religion is guaranteed by the fourteenth and first amendments,
the court, nevertheless, held that:
[I]t [does not] appear that petitioners may rely on federal constitutional guarantees since, of necessity, inmates of state prisons
may not be allowed to assert the usual federal
constitutional rights
2
guaranteed to nonincarcerated citizens.
The court did acknowledge, however, that "in cases of extreme mistreatment by prison officials, an inmate of a state prison may obtain
relief on federal constitutional grounds.'
Notwithstanding this seeming recognition of constitutional relief,
the court was nevertheless "reluctant to apply federal constitutional
doctrines to state prison rules reasonably necessary to the orderly
conduct of the state institution.

22

Again, one is left to wonder. The court's candor in stating its
dilemma is refreshing. How, indeed, can rights designed for free
men be applied in prison? How can a rule be said to be "reasonably
necessary" when there is no definition of the objective that the rule
is designed to achieve? When the court said, "reasonably necessary
to the orderly conduct" of the prison, did it mean that the maintenance
of order by itself was enough to overcome the Constitution?
In Sostre v. McGinnis,2" the problem suggested by these questions almost emerges; indeed, perhaps it does emerge. The suit was
by inmates of a state prison who sought relief under the Civil Rights
Act against interference with their practices as Muslims. After discussing various aspects of Muslim doctrines, as these pertained to the
problems of whether the doctrines constituted a religion, and the
impact on prison discipline of persons who demanded segregation
between whites and blacks and taught that whites were "evil," the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit concluded as follows:
The problem presented by the Muslim group is not whether
they should be permitted to have congregational services, a minister, religious literature, but rather, under what limitations protective of prison discipline they should be permitted these rights.
It is of little use for us to announce that because of the
religious content of the Muslims' beliefs and practices they must
be given the right, even in prison, to follow the dictates of their
faith, if we find it necessary immediately to add, "Of course all
these rights are subject to such reasonable rules and regulations
as the authorities impose."
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. at 671, 361 P.2d at 421.
Id.
Id.
334 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 892 (1964).
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In other words the nub of this whole situation is not to be
found in the existence of theoretical rights, but in the very practical limitations on those rights which are made necessary by the
requirements of prison discipline.
It is not the business of the Federal Courts to work out a
set of rules and regulations to govern the practice of religion in
the state prisons. Surely this is a task for the state authorities
to undertake. We do not stop with an empty declaration of
rights accompanied by generalities as to proper limitations on
those rights. We prefer, having given expression to the requirement that insofar as possible within the limits of prison discipline the Muslims be allowed what they ask for, not to leave
it at that, but to request that the state authorities propose the
rules or regulations which they believe are necessary.24
The court therefore reversed and remanded with instructions to the
district court to retain jurisdiction pending action by state authorities.
It is difficult to know how to appraise this decision, for appraisal
depends upon an unanswered question. When the prison authorities
do propose regulations "which they believe are necessary," what will
the court do then?5 If the courts accept a regulation as necessary
because the prison authorities say it is, we shall have gained very little.
I do not mean to deprecate what has been accomplished. It may
be hoped that some prisons will be somewhat better places because
the courts have shown an increased willingness to examine prisoners'
claims. 26 Nevertheless, unless relief is to be limited to "cases of ex24. Id. at 911-12.
25. A partial answer to this question appears in Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178
(2d Cir. 1971). There, in an action under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, and 28 U.S.C. §§ 133, 1343(3), the lower court had granted Sostre compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief against various New York prison
authorities. On appeal, the order was substantially modified. A majority of the court
of appeals, sitting en banc, held, inter alia, that the confinement imposed on Sostre
was not cruel and unusual punishment, and that the lower court had gone too far in
requiring procedural due process in disciplinary proceedings. In other respects, however, the court upheld Sostre's claims, as for example, with respect to his right to
communicate with counsel or public officials. The opinion is notable for its express
recognition of the fact that many penologists do not think that "correctional" systems
do any correcting. In general, however, the court declined to define by what standards
a prison should be measured. Instead, with frequent expressions of reluctance to
interfere with the prison officials' discretion, it limited itself to consideration of whether
Sostre's constitutional rights had been violated. In this respect, the following language of the court is indicative of the position taken:
We do not doubt the magnitude of the task ahead before our correctional
systems become acceptable and effective from a correctional, social and humane
viewpoint, but the proper tools for the job do not lie with a remote federal court.
The sensitivity to local nuance, opportunity for daily perseverance, and the human
and monetary resources required lie rather with legislators, executives, and
citizens in their communities. [Citation omitted.] 442 F.2d at 205.
See also Walker v. Blackwell, 411 F.2d 23 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Sharp v. Sigler, 408
F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1969) ; Knuckles v. Prasse, 302 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
26. Cf. Progress Report of the Chairman of the Board of Trustees and the
Superintendent of the Philadelphia Prisons (December, 1970), which stated that the
population of the Holmesburg Prison had, in less than six months, been reduced from
1310 to 746. On August 11, 1970, a three judge court had held that to confine an
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treme mistreatment,"2' 7 when a court is told that a prison regulation
is "necessary," it must ask, "Necessary for what?" At least, it must
if it wishes its review to be more than an obeisance to a warden's
asserted expertise.
When this is appreciated, the limitations of prisoners' suits become apparent: so far the suits have been unable to prod the courts
into asking, "Necessary for what?" It is not surprising that this
has been so. Prisoners' suits are stated in negative terms: not what
is good, but what is cruel and unusual, or otherwise unconstitutional,
or a denial of civil rights, or a tort. Consequently, the courts have
responded negatively: not by prescribing a model, but by forbidding
something, or by awarding damages. And so the prisons have continued, little changed, to be "schools of crime."28
III.

THE COURTS'

RELATIONSHIP

TO THE

PRISONS

No doubt it will be suggested that to remark that the courts
have failed to prescribe a model that prisons should emulate demonstrates a misunderstanding of the courts' role. Courts do not prescribe
models; rather, they proceed obliquely, hoping that by their prohibitions others, better fitted, will be encouraged to do the prescribing.
This point of view, besides being prudent, has the sanction of
tradition.2 9 Two observations, however, may be made. The first is
that the difference between a prohibitory and prescriptive order is
often slight, and may be merely semantic. When a court announces
that it will prohibit as evidence the fruit of an unconstitutional search, °
it may as well prescribe what the police must say when they apply
for a search warrant, 8' and how they must act when they execute
untried prisoner there constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Commonwealth ex
rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, No. 1567, (April Sessions, 1970), Nos. 353, 354, (May
Sessions, 1970), Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County (cases not reported).
27. In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 671, 361 P.2d 418, 421.
28. See generally TIME MAGAZINE, Jan. 18, 1971, at 48-55; 5 TRIAL, at 10-23
(Oct.-Nov. 1969). See also Burkhart, Why Prisons Aren't the Answer, The Sunday
Bulletin (Philadelphia), Jan. 10, 1971, § 2, at 1; Burkhart, Lifer Imprisoned for 26
Years Tells Of Frustrationand Despair, The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Jan.
11, 1971, at 1, col. 1; Burkhart, Women In Prison Tell of Loneliness, Boredom, The
Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Jan. 12, 1971, at 3, col. 3; Burkhart, Graterford
Reported Tense A Year After Strike, The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Jan. 13,
1971, at 3, col. 3; Burkhart, Detention Job Overloads Phila. Prisons, The Evening
Bulletin (Philadelphia), Jan. 14, 1971, at 3, col. 3. Cf. G. JACKSON, SOLFDAD BROTHER,
THE PRISON LETTERS OF GEORGE JACKSON (1970).
29. Compare A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(1970), with Wright, Professor Bickel, The Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme
Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). (As must be apparent from what has already
been said, in this debate I am with Judge Wright.)
30. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
31. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108 (1964).
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the warrants 32 or arrest a suspect.3 3 When a suspect is held entitled

to counsel, at preliminary arraignment,3" at trial, 35 and on appeal,3 6
the state is entitled to consider that it has been directed to increase
its appropriation to the Public Defender. When an election is enjoined
or set aside because the election district is disproportionate, 7 the
command to redraw the district boundaries is plain enough. Sometimes the court makes the command explicit, as when it prohibits
the use as evidence of a confession unless prescribed warnings have
been given the suspect.3 ' Even when prescription does not accompany
prohibition, there is the hint that prescription may follow. If schools
are not desegregated, the court, however reluctantly, may require busing or other action devised by the court to achieve desegregation.39
The second observation is, that even if in most cases the courts
should limit themselves to prohibition rather than prescription, with
respect to prisons the case is different. For prisons, unlike the police,
boards of elections, or school districts, are instruments of the courts.
Their task is to execute the courts' sentences. Accordingly, the courts
have the most immediate reason possible to prescribe how the prisons
shall be conducted.
The fact that the courts have nevertheless not prescribed, often,
as has been observed, declining even to examine a prisoner's complaint, much less doing anything about it, may perhaps be explained
as historical accident. Until the nineteenth century, persons convicted
of a crime were not imprisoned at all.4 Prisons were places of detention for those who were awaiting trial or were being held for such
matters as ransom, heresy, or debt. A person convicted of crime was
not punished by being committed to prison; he was hung, or mutilated,
or flogged, or submerged in cold water, or put in the stocks, or otherwise corporally punished. The first use of a prison as an instrument
of punishment occurred in 1681 in the colony of West Jersey, where

the Quakers, who disliked corporal punishment, provided a workhouse to confine convicted criminals at hard labor. According to
32. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
33. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964)
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
34. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
35. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
36. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
37. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
38. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
39. United States v. School District 151 of Cook County, Illinois, 286 F. Supp.
786 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968) (see especially the dissenting
opinion of Duffy, J., at 1138).
40. See generally Barnes, The Contemporary Prison: A Menace to Inmate
Rehabilitationand the Repression of Crime, 2 KEY IssuEs, at 11-12 (1965) ; Leopold,
Imprisonment Has No Future in a Free Society, 2 KEY ISSUES, at 24-26 (1965)
Weeks, Treatment: Past, Present, and Possible, 2 KEY ISSUES, at 57-59 (1965).
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Barnes, the "practical birth place" of our present prison system, not
only in the United States but in the world, was the Walnut Street
Jail, established in Philadelphia in 1790, to be followed by the prison
at Auburn, New York, completed in 1819, and the Eastern State
Penitentiary in Philadelphia, completed in 1829.
If a judge knows that the prisoner in the dock, if convicted, will
be dealt with summarily by corporal punishment, it is natural' for
the judge to concentrate upon the process by which guilt is determined and not to concern himself with the mechanics of how the
corporal punishment is inflicted. This attitude seems to have carried
over after corporal punishment was abandoned, with the courts evidently regarding confinement in a cell as an event as automatic and
as much beyond their concern as a flogging. For a while, this attitude
was justified. Confinement in a cell and a flogging were comparable
events; the proponents of confinement offered it as simply one form
of punishment substituted for another thought to be more cruel.
Before long, however, it became apparent that imprisonment was often
more cruel than corporal punishment. A prisoner kept in solitary confinement year after year and permitted to see no one suffered more
anguish than he would have at the whipping post.4 ' To be sure, it
was argued that by being confined the prisoner would be led to repent
and reform, but this was too plainly a rationalization to be convincing. By the middle of the nineteenth century, Sir Walter Crofton and
his associates had instituted the so-called Irish prison system, designed
to rehabilitate inmates and prepare them for a law-abiding life. This
attracted reformers in the United States, and led to the famous
Declaration of Principles of 1870 at the Cincinnati Prison Conference,
which led to the opening in 1876 of the Elmira Reformatory.
I do not mean to suggest that the reformers carried the day.
Generally, prisons have not yet caught up to the Cincinnati Declaration. In 1922, Tannenbaum said:
We must destroy the prison, root and branch. That will not
solve our problem, but it will be a good beginning. .

.

. Almost

anything will be an improvement. It cannot be worse. It cannot
be more brutal or more useless.42
41. Cf. Charles Dickens' conclusion, after an 1842 visit to the Eastern State
Penitentiary:My firm conviction is that, independent of the mental anguish it occasions an anguish so acute and so tremendous, that all imagination of it must fall far
short of the reality - it wears the mind into a morbid state, which renders it
unfit for the rough contact and busy action of the world. It is my fixed opinion
that those who have undergone this punishment MUST pass into society again
morally unhealthy and diseased.
C. DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 157-58 (undated).
42. F. TANNENBAUM, WALL SHADOWS: A STUDY IN AMERICAN PRISONS 141-42
(1922), quoted in 2 KEY ISSUES, at 9 (1965).
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In 1933, Sellin said:
Even the prisons of the western world have not yet reached the
minimum demands for decent physical treatment. . . . Penal institutions are now largely peopled by recidivists. . ...
And in 1970, the Director of the Institute of Correctional Administration at The American University said:
It can be stated conservatively that over half of the major prisons
and reformatories in the United States are just "sweet jails" institutions where prisoners dawdle at their work, engage in a
variety of desultory social and educational activities, receive good
medical care, and live under so-called programs of treatment
which have little or no
relation to the particular criminal problem
4
of any one of them .
But the failure of the reformers may, to a considerable extent,
be attributed to the indifference of the courts. When the reformers
had demonstrated that at least one purpose of imprisonment was rehabilitation, the courts should have recognized that a judgment of
sentence to prison was a continuing judgment. No chancellor would
order a defendant to abate a nuisance within a given time, and forget
about the Case. Yet judges committed men to prison for years, and
forgot about them.
This indifference, I believe, is one of the principal reasons for
the disrepute into which the courts have fallen. And properly so.
Suppose a surgeon were asked to perform a routine - not emergency - operation with an instrument known to be defective. He
would be properly criticized. Furthermore, his reputation would suffer
if he attempted to defend his actions by saying that the instrument
was the best the hospital had provided. When a judge sentences a
man to prison, knowing that the prison not only will not rehabilitate
the prisoner but will make him worse, it is hardly persuasive to reply
to public criticism that the prison is the best the legislature and executive have provided.
You will observe that in speaking this way I have turned the
discussion around. We started with a consideration of what prisoners'
rights were, as these appeared from an examination of suits brought
by prisoners. The problem now, however, is not what rights prisoners
have, but what rights the public has. A sentence to prison has several
purposes: it should be just to the prisoner in that it is not disproportionate to his offense; it may deter others from committing a like
43. Sellin, Penal Institutions, 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SERVICES 63-64,
quoted in 2 KEY ISSUEs, at 8-9 (1965).
44. Gill, A New Prison Discipline, FEDERAL PROBATION, June, 1970, at 30.
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offense; and it should protect the public, at once, by taking the prisoner
out of the community, but also ultimately enabling, or at least helping,
the prisoner to return to the community as a law-abiding citizen.
When a judge sentences a man to a prison that will probably make
him less fitted to act as a law-abiding citizen, the sentence fails in
one of its major purposes.45
IV.

HOW

CAN THE COURTS FULFILL THEIR RESPONSIBILITY
FOR PRISON REFORM?

It is submitted that, if the courts are to fulfill their responsibility
for prison reform by making their sentences more effective, there are
two efforts in which they should engage. The first of these is in the
context of prisoners' suits, and the second involves court administration.
A.

Prisoners' suits

It has been seen that relief in prisoners' suits will be limited,
and consequently the prisons will change little so long as the courts
continue to subordinate prisoners' rights to prison regulations asserted
by the warden to be "necessary." If the courts will recognize, however, that the warden is on the court's business, it will follow that the
warden will be regarded as an officer of any agency comparable to
any administrative agency entrusted with governmental business. His
assertion that something is "necessary" may then be reviewed, and a
prisoner asserting that it is not "necessary" may request the review.
If the court will further define the purposes of what it expects the prison
as its agency to achieve, the review will not be confined to the negative
and limited test of whether a constituitonal right has been violated,
but may be conducted according to a broader test designed to determine the effectiveness of the prison's execution of the court's sentence.
An example seems appropriate. If one purpose of a prison sentence
be to help the prisoner become a law-abiding citizen by the time he
is released, is it reasonably necessary to this purpose that the prisoner
45. Perhaps it may be said that with respect to a prisoner condemned to'death,
the only function of the prison is to confine him until he is executed. Even in such a
case, however, the prisoner may receive a reprieve, and, as is true of many prisoners
sentenced to life imprisonment, eventually be released. For a discussion of the relationship of the goals of rehabilitation, deterrence, and prevention, see L. FULLER,
ANATOMY OF THE LAW 32-36 (1968). As Fuller observes, in some cases deterrence
will be the sole purpose of the sentence (imprisonment of a corporate official for price
fixing), and in others, prevention will be (rehabilitation of dangerous offender not
practical because of psychological reasons). But in most cases rehabilitation is so
clearly at least one, and probably the principal, purpose of the sentence, that discussion here of the philosophy of punishment would be beside the point, which is not
to suggest that there is a constitutional right to rehabilitation. Cf. Powell v. Texas,
392 U.S. 514, 530 (1968) ("This Court has never held that anything in the Constitution requires that penal sanctions be designed solely to achieve therapeutic or rehabilitative effects ..
") The issue is what is an effective sentence.
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be forbidden visits by his children or denied books sent him by his
parents? Is it necessary that he be required to have his hair cut short,
submit his mail to a censor or work in a shop or on a farm that teaches
him nothing that will enable him to get a job?
No doubt it will be argued that judges are not penologists and
should not meddle in prison administration. However, neither are
judges economists, transportation experts, or electrical engineers; and
yet they regularly review decisions of the Federal Trade Commission,
Interstate Commerce Commission, and Federal Power Commission."'
As has been said:
The principal purpose of limited judicial review of administrative
action is to insure that the decision-makers have (1) reached a
reasoned and not unreasonable decision, (2) by employing the
proper criteria, and (3) without overlooking anything of substantial relevance. More than this the courts do not pretend to
do, and probably are not competent to do. To do less would
abandon the interests affected to the absolute power of administrative officials. 7
Were this approach applied to the review of what happens in prisons,
we should all benefit as we always do when the law becomes more just.
Cruelties and inadequacies now hidden would be revealed. Prisoners
would be given hope and would be helped to become law-abiding
citizens. Finally, prison administrators would be encouraged to seek
support for changes many of them have long desired.
Not only the principle of judicial review, but the whole
scheme of American government, reflects an institutionalized mistrust of any . . . unchecked and unbalanced power over essential

liberties. That mistrust does not depend on an assumption of
inveterate venality or incompetence on the part of men in power,
be they Presidents, legislators, administrators, judges, or doctors.
It is not doctors' nature, but human nature, which benefits from
the prospect and the fact of supervision.48
46. See Bazelon, Right to Treatment -

Implementation, 36 U. CmI. L. REv. 742

(1969). With respect to judicial review of the treatment of a person committed to a
mental institution, the author makes the following observations:
Very few judges are psychiatrists. But equally few are economists, aeronautical engineers, atomic scientists, or marine biologists. For some reason, however,
many people seem to accept judicial scrutiny of, say, the effect of a proposed dam
on fish life, while they reject similar scrutiny of the effect of psychiatric treatment on human lives. Since it can hardly be that we are more concerned for the
salmon than the schizophrenic, I suspect the explanation must lie in our familiarity
with judicial supervision of such matters as railroad rates, airplane design, power
plant construction, and dam building. While the importance of this factor can
be overestimated, in the law as in all other areas we tend to accept the accustomed and fear the new.
Id. at 743.
47. Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617, 621 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
48. Id.
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Court administration

It may be granted that the usual agencies of prison reform have
been the legislative and executive branches. In Pennsylvania today
there are developments in those branches which encourage the hope
that substantial reform may not be far away. A self-respecting judicial
branch, however, will not await legislative or executive initiative. To
revert to the example of the surgeon furnished a defective instrument:
if he values his professional honor, he will not wait until the hospital
administrator perhaps recognizes the need for new instruments; rather,
he will go to the administrator and ask for new instruments. If the
administrator still declines to act, the doctor will try to compel action.
I suggest that this analogy is quite exact, and furnishes an example
that the courts might follow.
At least in Pennsylvania, the supreme court has most extraordinary powers of supervision over the lower courts. These powers
derive from the supreme court's position as successor to the King's
Bench, 9 and have been both confirmed and extended by the new
judiciary article of the Pennsylvania Constitution, adopted in 1968."
It is interesting to speculate whether the proposition could be defended that pursuant to these powers, the supreme court might prohibit the execution of a judgment of sentence upon sufficient proof
that the sentence could not be effectively carried out because of the
inadequacies of the prison. However, one need not venture so far.
It seems clear that at least the court could require the lower courts,
and the prisons as agencies responsible for the execution of the lower
courts' judgments of sentence,51 to submit regular reports from which
it could be determined whether the prisons were effective. Suppose
it appeared, as I believe it would, that the prisons were so ineffective
as to justify the public loss of confidence in the judicial process.
What then?
First, the supreme court might petition the legislative and executive branches to appropriate funds and otherwise act so as to improve
the prisons. It would be my expectation that such a petition would,
if carefully documented, be sufficient, for concern regarding the prisons
is by now widespread. But if the petition were ignored, I do not con49. Commonwealth v. Harris, 409 Pa. 163, 185 A.2d 586 (1962) ; Carpentertown
Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 61 A.2d 426 (1948); Schmuck v. Hartman,
222 Pa. 190, 70 A. 1091 (1908).
50. PA. CONST. art. 5, § 10.
51. Cf. Carpentertown Coal & Coke Co. v. Laird, 360 Pa. 94, 101, 61 A.2d 426,
429 (1948). See also In re First Congressional District Election, 295 Pa. 1, 144 A.
735 (1928), holding that the supreme court's supervisory powers extend "'not only to
inferior judicial tribunals, but also to inferior ministerial tribunals, possessing incidentally judicial powers, and known as quasi-judicial tribunals'." Id. at 13, 144
A. at 739.
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cede the court to be without resource. To the contrary, I suggest that
it has the power to compel by writ of mandamus the appropriation of
such funds as are reasonably necessary to provide effective prisons.
A pertinent decision has recently been filed by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania."2 Generally stated, the facts were these: On June
16, 1970, after the Philadelphia City Council had rejected a request
by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for additional
funds, the President Judge of the court instituted an action in mandamus against the Mayor and other members of the Philadelphia City
Government, announcing that:
[A]ny constitutionally established judicial system such as the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia has the power to determine for itself what sums are reasonably necessary to carry out its
constitutionally mandated functions ...
If the court system is to be truly independent as an equal
coordinate branch, then it must be free of political control and
not subject to the whims of either the executive or legislative
departments.
[T]he one who controls the purse strings has the
absolute power to control those who depend on the contents of
the purse ....53
On September 30, 1970, a judge specially assigned issued an order
awarding plaintiff $2,458,000. Both plaintiff and defendants appealed.
The supreme court affirmed, only reducing the order "to reflect the
amount of time remaining in this fiscal year.""
The basis of the affirmance was that the judiciary, as "an independent and co-equal Branch of Government, along with the Executive
and Legislative Branches" "must possess rights and powers co-equal
with its functions and duties, including the right and power to protect
itself against any impairment thereof." 5 From this it was held to
follow that "courts have inherent power to do all things that are
reasonably necessary for the proper administration of their office with52. Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, __ Pa. __ 274 A.2d 193 (1971).
53. Brief for Plaintiff at 1, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate- .....
Pa.......

274 A.2d 193 (1971).

54. The opinion of the court was by Chief Justice Bell. Mr. Justice Jones filed
a concurring opinion, in which Mr. Justice Eagen joined. Mr. Justice Pomeroy filed
a concurring opinion and Mr. Justice Roberts filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.
Mr. Justice Cohen took no part in the decision of the case.
55. The Chief Justice cited: Stander v. Kelley, 433 Pa. 406, 420-24, 250 A.2d
474, 481-83 (1969) ; Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 66 A.2d 577 (1949) ; Wilson v.
Phila. School District, 328 Pa. 225, 228, 195 A. 90, .93 (1937); Commonwealth v.
Mathues, 210 Pa. 372, 423-25, 59 A. 961 [omitted in Atlantic] (1904) ; DeChestellux
v. Fairchild, 15 Pa. 18, 20 (1950) ; Commonwealth v. Mann, 5 W.&S. 403, 406, 408,
410, 420-21 (Pa. 1843); In re Surcharge of County Commissioners, 12 D.&C. 471
(Lack. Co. 1928).
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In reaching this conclusion,

the court said:
The confidence, reliance and trust in our Courts and in our
Judicial system on the part of the Bench and the Bar, as well
as the general public, 57have been seriously eroded. We cannot permit this to continue.

Mr. Justice Pomeroy largely devoted his concurring opinion to
an elaboration of the implications of this statement, noting that:
the erosion referred to cannot be laid at the door of the defendants
in this case, nor can the reappraisal of the judicial processes and
system, even in Philadelphia, be considered their sole responsibility. The imperative reexamination which the Court has called
for is, as I view it, one which must engage the attention and
energy of all branches of government and of the public as well,
but remain a principal preoccupation and responsibility of the
members of the judiciary, particularly of this Court [footnote
omitted], and of the bar.5
The principal feature of the court's order concerned the demand
by the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas for funds for its adult
and juvenile probation departments. At the hearing before the trial
judge, the court of common pleas had offered extensive testimony
that its probation departments were so understaffed as to render probation frequently illusory.5" Of the $2,458,000 awarded by the trial
judge, $1,050,000 was for probation. Probation is but another form
of sentence. Thus, I suggest, it has now been established in principle
that a court has the inherent power to require the appropriation of
such funds as are reasonably necessary to ensure that its sentences
will be effective.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court has said:
In part, the terrible price we are paying in crime is because
we have tended - once the drama of the trial is over - to regard
all criminals as human rubbish .... We lawyers and judges some-

times tend to fall in love with procedures and techniques and
formalism. .

.

. The imbalance in our system of criminal justice

56. Quotinq In re Surcharge of County Commissioners, 12 Pa. D.&C. 471, 475
(Lack. Co. 1928), adopted in, Leahey v. Farrell, 362 Pa. 52, 58, 66 A.2d 579, 579-80
(1949).
57. __ Pa. at - 274 A.2d at 199.
58. Id. at
, 274 A.2d at 200 (Pomeroy, J., concurring).
59. Brief for Plaintiff at 59-69, Commonwealth ex rel. Carroll v. Tate, - Pa.
274 A.2d 193 (1971).
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must be corrected so that we give at least as much attention to the
defendant after he is found guilty as before.
Whether we find it palatable or not, we must proceed, even
in the face of bitter contrary experiences, in the belief that every
human being has a spark somewhere hidden in him that will
make . . . possible . . . redemption and rehabilitation.

If we

accept the idea that each human, however bad, is a child of God,
we must look for that spark."
Thus far the courts, rather than looking, have too often tended
to close their eyes. The suggestions in this paper are offered as an
encouragement to them to look, and having seen, to act.
60. 5 TRIAL, at 15 (Oct.-Nov. 1969).
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